Israel’s back-to-back assassinations this week—first of a Hezbollah commander in Lebanon, then of Hamas’ political leader in Iran—clearly indicate that its wars with both foes are far from over. Do they constitute an “escalation” of the conflicts, as some fear? That’s hard to say, though Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems to suggest that he’s willing to take that risk.
Israel described the airstrike on Beirut, killing Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah’s most senior military officer, as retaliation to Sunday’s rocket that killed 12 children on a soccer field in Israel-controlled Golan Heights. (Hezbollah has denied responsibility, though Israeli and U.S. intelligence point to the Iranian-backed militia as the source of the rocket attack.)
The killing of Hamas’ leader, Ismail Haniyeh, is another matter. He was visiting Tehran, among several invited guests to the inauguration of Iran’s new president, and the timing of this airstrike—which Israel has neither confirmed nor denied, though no other country has the means or motives to pull it off—is as yet unclear. (Haniyeh lives mainly in Doha, the capital of Qatar, which would be diplomatically awkward for Israel to attack, but he has visited Iran in the past, to no peril.)
Some press accounts have described Haniyeh as “moderate,” but there is no such thing as a moderate Hamas leader, at least when it comes to viewing Israel as a target to be wiped out. He has been Hamas’ negotiator in the mediated cease-fire talks involving Israel, the U.S., Qatar, and Egypt, but this only means he’s been an errand boy for the terrorist group’s real leader, Yahya Sinwar.
That said, the murder of even the mere public face of a negotiator still means a delay, if not a setback, to the talks themselves. For the murder to take place on Iranian territory, in the form of an Israeli airstrike, means an all-but-inevitable retaliation from Tehran—the only questions being where and how intensely.
Netanyahu and his top aides must have anticipated both reactions. It is likely (and here, we must wander into the realm of informed speculation) they don’t care; possibly they welcome the openly heightened tensions.
Hamas is both the instigator of the war in Gaza—the result of its Oct. 7 assault on Israel—and the main obstacle to a cease-fire. But Netanyahu is not eager for an armistice either, certainly not before his army destroys Hamas as a political and military entity—a goal that many of his own generals see as infeasible. In his hourlong address to Congress last week, he repeated his cry for “total victory” without so much as mentioning the talks—making very clear that he has no interest in even feigning a desire for a diplomatic breakthrough.
The only goal, in his mind (and he is not alone among Israelis here), is to kill as many Hamas gunmen and leaders as he can. Haniyeh was a ripe target, outside his zone of diplomatic protection and perhaps feeling less vulnerable than he should have been.
The killing also sent a message to the Iranians: We can strike your assets and allies whenever and wherever we want. Israel sent a similar message in April after Iran fired 300 missiles and drones against Israel (almost all of which either crashed along the way or were shot down). It launched a missile that severely damaged the air-defense radar protecting Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. The message: We’re not destroying Natanz—but we can if we want to. Soon after that attack, the exchange of volleys, which some thought might escalate to all-out war, came to an end.
It’s also possible that the proximity of the attacks—they occurred within hours of each other—was meant to send still another signal: We can fight on three fronts, with deadly precision, all at once.
Washington’s reaction to this display has been mixed. President Joe Biden’s top aides had urged Israel to respond to the rocket attack on Golan with restraint. Arguably killing Hamas’ top military commander without doing much other damage is an act of restraint with a shock effect. However, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Israel launched its airstrike on Iran without first consulting him or other U.S. officials, and he stressed that the main “imperative” for all parties remains “getting a cease-fire.”
Until Oct. 7, Hezbollah seemed to pose a larger threat to Israel than Hamas did—and, given that it is believed to have over 100,000 rockets, it still does. Hezbollah has stepped up rocket attacks against Israel in recent weeks, but they are pinpricks compared with the damage it could inflict if the war went full-blown.
The two conflicts—with Hamas to the south and with Hezbollah to the north—have distinct causes and histories. But Hezbollah claims they are fighting in solidarity with Hamas and, therefore, a cease-fire in Gaza would promote calm on the Lebanese border while a never-ending war in Gaza would mean the same on their front.
To an extent that isn’t quite known, Hezbollah’s actions, one way or the other, are directed (or at least given a wink and nod) by Iran. So, will Israel’s killing of a foreign guest on Iranian soil spur Tehran to give Hezbollah the green light for more massive attacks against Israel? Or, perhaps after some obligatory, less-than-cataclysmic retaliation, will things settle down? And whichever way the winds of war blow, how will Israel respond—and what will the United States do, and encourage or discourage Israel from doing, next?
This all comes at what might—repeat: might—be a turning point of sorts for Iran. The newly elected president, Masoud Pezeshkian, ran and won on a platform of engaging the West, mainly in order to relieve Iran’s ailing economy. He has since reportedly appointed as his foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, who was the chief negotiator in the Iran nuclear deal.
True, Iranian presidents have limited power—the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the Supreme Leader (a term that means what it seems to mean)—but they do have some power, and they do make some difference. When Hassan Rouhani was president, he started the nuclear talks with the West, something that neither his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, nor his successor, Ebrahim Raisi—both more hard-line—could have conceivably done.
Was it such a good idea—for Israeli security and regional stability—to launch an airstrike on Iran just after the new president, who at least speaks as a moderate, has taken office? Will the attack harden the ayatollah’s views and make him less likely to give Pezeshkian any leeway?
Netanyahu would probably answer that it doesn’t matter. He sees the notion of a moderate Iranian president as mythical. He hated the Iran nuclear deal, opposed it in the most adamant terms in a speech to the Congress almost a decade ago, and successfully persuaded then-President Donald Trump to withdraw from the deal and to reimpose sanctions on Iran. If Israel’s airstrike makes the new Iranian president less likely to speak moderately or beg for sanctions relief or try to reopen the nuclear deal, Netanyahu would likely see that as a good thing—one less way, as he sees it, for Iran to snooker Western leaders who don’t understand the true dangers.
Meanwhile, for all the tensions between Netanyahu and Biden, the Israeli prime minister came away from his recent trip to Washington with reassurances that the United States will have Israel’s back if it ever comes under attack, especially attack by Iran—from Biden, from Vice President (and possibly future president) Kamala Harris, and especially from a majority in Congress (who whooped and hollered at his every boast of impending victory).
Netanyahu feels he has cover. Will that make him more reckless? Will that spur the Iranians to turn up the heat, both to puncture Israel’s complacency and to assure their own allies that they don’t cower in the face of direct attack?
U.S. officials are no doubt on the phones, trying to soothe and pressure all parties to calm down and resist the urges to escalate or widen the war, which can only mean misery and mayhem for all sides. Whether we retain the leverage to bring the players back to some uneasy equilibrium, we shall soon see.
